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The Duty to Rescue in California: A
Legislative Solution?
In March 1983 appalling news accounts of a multiple rape in New
Bedford, Massachusetts were circulated.' A twenty-one year old woman
stopped in a local tavern for cigarettes and a drink and emerged after
midnight bruised, half naked, and screaming for help. The victim
relayed a terrifying narrative of being hoisted onto a pool table and
then tormented and raped repeatedly by a group of men for over
two hours. Patrons of the bar stood watching, some taunted and
cheered, but most importantly, no one assisted the victim or notified
authorities.2
The behavior of passive bystanders first came into public focus in
1964, when thirty-eight people watched or listened for an extended
period while Kitty Genovese was murdered outside an apartment
building in New York City.3 Without a doubt, the inaction of the
witnesses to these crimes is barbaric and morally reprehensible. Legally,
however, these bystanders are under no obligation to aid another person in danger or peril.4
The common-law rule that a bystander is under no legal duty to
rescue another person remains in our legal system despite numerous
examples of callous refusals to render aid. 5 For example, an expert
swimmer is under no obligation to rescue a drowning man within
reach, 6 and the law imposes no liability upon a witness who stands
by and watches another bleed to death.7 The refusal of the common
law to recognize a moral obligation of one person to aid another
has been criticized repeatedly.' To reconcile legal principles with moral

1. See Clendinen, Barroom Rape Shames Town of Proud Heritage, N.Y. Times, March
12, 1983, at A16, col. 1; Ogren, Good Samaritanism Ought Not To Be Optional, L.A. Times,
August, 1983; Kiesel, Who Saw This Happen?, 69 A.B.A.J. 1208, 1208 (September, 1983).
2. Clendinen, supra note 1, at A16.
3. Kiesel, supra note 1, at 1208.
4. See Ogren, supra note 1, at 218; W. PROSSER, Tnm LAW oF TORTS 346, (4th Ed. 1971).
5. See Ogren, supra note 1, at 218; PROSSER, supra note 4, at 340.
6. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 340.

7. See id. at 341.
8. Soldano v. O'Daniels, 141 Cal. App. 3d 443, 447, 190 Cal. Rptr. 310, 313 (1983);
see, e.g., Ames, Law and Morals, 22 H~Av. L. Rav. 97, 97 (1908); Bohlen, The Moral Duty
to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. PA. L. REv. 217, 217-18 (1908); SHELEFF,
Tim BYSTANDER, 103 (1978).
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obligations, courts gradually have expanded the concept of legal duty.9
Currently, certain special relationships are recognized as giving rise
to an affirmative duty to assist. 10 These judicial expansions of the
duty to rescue, however, do not apply in situations like those discussed
above, because the bystander has no existing familial or professional
relationship with the victim.
The infamous Genovese murder in 1964 led to numerous articles,
books, and conferences calling for a statutory abrogation of the
common-law no duty position." Until recently the recommendations
of these commentators went unheeded, except in Vermont, where the
Duty to Aid the Endangered Act was enacted in 1967.12 The Vermont statute requires a bystander to render reasonable assistance to
the extent that assistance can be rendered without injury to the
rescuer.' 3 Between 1967 and 1982, the common-law no duty rule remained intact in all other states.
Since 1982, as a result of public outrage following events such as
the recent rape in New Bedford, Massachusetts,' and increased public
interest in crime prevention and control,' 5 four states have adopted
statutes requiring affirmative conduct to assist another person in peril.' 6
This comment will focus on this legislative trend and advocate the
enactment of a similar statutory duty to rescue in California. To

Note, The Duty to Rescue, 47 IND. L. J. 321, 321 (1972).
See infra text accompanying notes 57-60.
11. See, e.g., THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE LAW (J. Ratcliffe ed. 1966) (a compilation
of articles presented at a Chicago symposium on the subject of rescue).
12. VT. STAT. ANN. Tr. 12, § 519 (1967). The statute is referred to as the Duty to Aid
the Endangered Act and provides:
(a) A person who knows that another is exposed to grave physical harm shall, to
the extent that the same can be rendered without danger or peril to himself or without
interference with important duties owed to others, give reasonable assistance to the
exposed person unless that assistance or care is being provided by others.
(b) A person who provides reasonable assistance in compliance with subsection (a)
of this section shall not be liable in civil damages unless his acts constitute gross
negligence or unless he will receive or expects to receive remuneration. Nothing contained in this subsection shall alter existing law with respect to tort liability of a
practitioner of the healing arts committed in the ordinary course of his practice.
(c) A person who willfully violates subsection (a) of this section shall be fined not
more than $100.00.
Id.
13. See id. In addition to the Vermont statute, almost all continental European countries
have enacted duty to rescue statutes. See Feldbrugge, Good and Bad Samaritans:A Comparative
Survey of the Criminal Law Provisions Concerning Failure to Rescue, 14 AM. J. ComP. L.,
630, appendix (1966).
14. See Clendinen, supra note 1, at A16.
15. See Soldano, 141 Cal. App. 3d at 449, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 314.
16. These states are Massachusetts, Minnesota, Rhode Island, and Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania statute was pending in the legislature at the time of publication. See infra notes 188-99
and accompanying text. See also Kiesel, supra note 1, at 1208; Ogren, supra note 1, at 218.
9.
10.
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accomplish this, the evolution of the common-law concept of duty
will be examined, 7 with particular emphasis on California decisional
law.' 8 California courts, frequent forerunners in the expansion and
revision of common-law rules, 19 have expanded the concept of duty
in recent years. 20 Despite this expansion of duty in other areas, California courts have not imposed a general duty to rescue in most
situations. 2
An examination of recent California cases imposing an affirmative
duty to warn 22 will reveal that courts have focused principally upon
the defendant's knowledge of impending peril to the victim and the
public interest in freedom from violent assault. 23 These considerations
will be shown to be equally applicable in a duty to rescue context.24
In addition, existing legislatively imposed duties in California will be
analyzed.2 5 These statutes indicate the legislative interest in promoting
26
social behavior that is consistent with community morality.
The Vermont law and the more recent legislative enactments in other
states will be compared and contrasted to illustrate the viability of
a statutorily imposed duty to rescue. 27 Moral and practical considerations relating to a statutory duty to rescue will be scrutinized to counter
frequently posited arguments against an affirmative legal duty. 28 A
possible civil supplement to a criminal duty to rescue also will be
discussed. 29 Finally, a model statute will be proposed for California."
An inquiry into the viability of a statutory duty to rescue in California necessarily requires an examination of the judicial concept of duty
and the evolution of that concept. The following discussion includes
analyses of the common-law rules recognized in the United States,
particularly in California. This discussion is relevant to a later analysis
of the legislative response to the judicial treatment of the duty to
rescue. 3
17.

See infra notes 32-56 and accompanying text.

18.
19.

See infra notes 77-148 and accompanying text.
See infra note 77.

20. See Soldano, 141 Cal. App. 3d at 448, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 313.
21. See Winkelman v. City of Sunnyvale, 59 Cal. App. 3d 509, 512, 130 Cal. Rptr. 690,
691 (1976).
22. See infra notes 100-119 and accompanying text.
23. See id.
24. See infra notes 151-65 and accompanying text.

25. See infra notes 151-66 and accompanying text.
26. Id.

27. See infra notes 167-99 and accompanying text.
28.
29.

See infra notes 201-50 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 251-57 and accompanying text.

30. See infra appendix.
31. See infra notes 167-200 and accompanying text.
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COMMON-LAW DUTY
Historically, the law has recognized a distinction between misfeasance
and nonfeasance." This distinction has resulted in the imposition of
legal liability for proscribed affirmative conduct (misfeasance). Conversely, the absence of affirmative conduct (nonfeasance) has resulted
in an absence of legal liability. This distinction applies with equal
force to the duty to rescue situation, with tort immunity for bystanders
who fail to act affirmatively. 3
Commensurate with the reluctance of the early common-law courts
to require affirmative conduct was a disinclination to recognize the
legal rights of an individual who voluntarily rescued another person
in peril.3 4 Early tort law did not provide compensation for rescuers
who were injured in the course of the rescue." Furthermore, despite
the absence of a legal duty to render aid, a voluntary rescuer was
liable for ordinary negligent acts or omissions that occurred during
the course of the rescue.36
The early common-law courts adhered to the idea that laws were
intended to prevent people from harming one another, not force them
to confer benefits upon each other.37 Moreover, the imposition of
affirmative duties was considered to be an infringement on personal
independence and freedom because legal philosophy idealized these
rights.38 These courts also found that altruistic behavior was impossibecause of the unique moral foundations of each
ble to standardize
39
individual.
The difficulty in developing workable standards for rescue behavior
often is discussed as an explanation for the endurance of the common-

32. See PROSSER, supra note 4, at 338-50. Nonfeasance was not recognized in the commonlaw English courts because of the difficulties incorporating inaction in the writs that were the
basis of each cause of action. See Bohlen, supra note 8, at 219-22.
33.
34.
35.
36.

See PROSSER, supra note 4, at 338-50.
See Linden, Rescuers and Good Samaritans, 34 MOD. L. Ray. 241, 242 (1971).
Id.
See Comment, Duty to Aid the Endangered Act: The Impact and Potential of the

Vermont Approach, 7 VT. L. Ray. 143, 150 (1982); see also PROSSER, supra note 4, at 343

(discussing the duties and liabilities of rescuers). Modernly, most statutes imposing a duty to

rescue carry with them tort immunity for ordinary negligence. See infra notes 168-99 and accompanying text; Linden, supra note 33, at 242.
37. See Ames, supra note 8, at 97.

38. See Linden, supra note 33, at 242; PROSSER, supra note 4, at 339.
39.

Myers v. Quesenberry, 144 Cal. App. 3d 888, 892, 193 Cal. Rptr. 733, 735 (1983);

supra note 4, at 341. In addition, requiring a complete stranger to risk danger or
death to effectuate a rescue does not seem reasonable. Moreover, the courts refused to recognize
PROSSER,

a duty rather than address the difficult problems of causation and proximate cause. Linden,
supra note 33, at 242.
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law no duty rule.40 For example, the determination of who among
the many individuals on a crowded beach should be liable for the
drowning of a person within full view of everyone would be a problem not easily resolved. 41 Furthermore, courts are cognizant of the
difficulties in standardizing the degree of risk a bystander is required
to take in effectuating a rescue. 42 Lastly, courts are unable to promulgate a general rule for determining how long a rescuer must continue assistance if, for example, the victim is starving or bleeding to
death.4 3 Rather than attempting to create lines of demarcation for
tort liability in the failure to rescue context, courts have adhered to
the no duty rule.44
Based on the traditional notions of individual freedom and the difficulties in creating workable standards, the common-law no duty rule
has persisted, resulting in some shocking case law. In Yania v. Bigan,45
for example, a landowner taunted and coaxed a business invitee to
jump into a water filled trench. After the invitee obeyed, the landowner refused to go to the aid of the drowning victim. The court
held that the defendant had no legal duty to rescue the victim. 6 The
47
court maintained that the victim was aware of the risks involved
and that the defendant had satisfied his duty to warn of a dangerous
condition. 8
In another case, Osterlind v. Hill, 9 the defendant rented a canoe
to the victim, who was visibly intoxicated. The canoe capsized, and
the victim clung to it for one-half hour, calling repeatedly for help.
The defendant ignored the victim's calls for assistance, and the victim drowned. The court held that no legal duty to rescue existed,
and characterized the failure of the defendant to respond to the victim's calls as immaterial to the case. 5"
More recently, a Georgia court refused to impose a duty to rescue

supra note 4, at 341.

40.

See

41.

See id.; Linden, supra note 33, at 242. One commentator has suggested that a possible

PROSSER,

solution to this problem is simply to make the several bystanders liable as joint tortfeasors.
Comment, Beyond Good Samaritans and Moral Monsters: An Individualistic Justification of
the General Legal Duty to Rescue, 31 UCLA L. REv. 252, 271 (1983).
42. Linden, supra note 33, at 242.
43. Id.
44. See PROSSER, supra note 4, at 341; see also Winkelman v. City of Sunnyvale, 59 Cal.
App. 3d 509, 512, 130 Cal. Rptr. 690, 691 (1976).
45. 155 A.2d 343 (Pa. 1959).

46. 155 A.2d at 346.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49.
50.

160 N.E. 301 (Mass. 1928).
160 N.E. at 302.

1265

Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 15

in Handiboe v. McCarthy.' Plaintiff's four year old son, invited to play
on defendant's premises, fell into a swimming pool and drowned.
The failure of the defendant's servant to rescue the child was held
not actionable because of the absence of a legal duty to rescue."
Although courts confronted with similar factual situations acknowledge
a moral duty to rescue, 3 courts have been unwilling to impose a legal
duty on that basis alone."'
The common-law concern for individual freedom becomes less admirable in the context of cases similar to these. Resulting from the
judicial repugnancy to according tort immunity in certain situations,
courts gradually have etched out several exceptions to the no duty
rule." While these exceptions do not result in a complete abrogation
of the common-law rule, they do indicate judicial willingness to utilize
moral and public policy considerations as a basis for the imposition
of legal liability."
JUDICIAL EXCEPTIONS TO THE

No DUTY

RULE

The existence of the various exceptions to the no duty rule represent a judicial attempt to close the gap between law and morality
by requiring affirmative conduct when a special relationship exists."
Traditionally, the only relationships giving rise to a duty to rescue
and
innkeeper-guest,
common
carrier-passenger,
were
shipmaster-seaman.5 8 This early list of special relationships, however,
gradually has been expanded, indicating an increased inclination of
courts to equate moral and legal duties. 9 As a result, in addition
to the exceptions noted above, modern decisional law recognizes the
following exceptions to the no duty rule: landowner-invitee, law enforcement officer-prisoner, employer-employee, school-student,
hospital-patient, and parent-child.6" Even in the absence of a legally

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

151 S.E.2d 905, 907 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966).
Id. at 907.
Yania v. Bigan, 155 A.2d 343, 346.
See Winkelman v. City of Sunnyvale, 59 Cal. App. 3d at 512, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 691.
Note, Duty to Rescue, supra note 9, at 321.

56.
57.

See id.
See D'Amato, The Bad Samaritan Paradigm, 70 N.W. L. REV. 798, 800 (1976); Myers

v. Quesenberry, 144 Cal. App. 3d 888, 892, 193 Cal. Rptr. 733, 735 (1983).
58. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS §314A; 4 B. WrrKIN, SUMMAY OF CALiFORNIA LAW,
Torts §55 (8th ed. 1973).
59. See PROSSER, supra note 4, at 341-42; Myers v. Quesenberry, 144 Cal. App. 3d 888,
889, 193 Cal. Rptr. 733, 734 (1983); Soldano v. O'Daniels, 141 Cal. App. 3d 443, 447-48,
190 Cal. Rptr. 310, 313-314 (1983).
60. Prosser,supra note 4, at 341; WrrKiN, supra note 57, §555; see Myers 144 Cal. App.
3d at 893, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 735.
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recognized special relationship, courts have created additional exceptions to the no duty rule. These exceptions, discussed below, can be
characterized as "special circumstances" that lead courts to impose
an affirmative duty.
One example of a judicially recognized "special circumstance" exists
when an actor knows or should know that his conduct has caused bodily
harm to a victim who is helpless and in danger of further bodily harm.
A duty is imposed requiring reasonable care to prevent the further
harm.6" Moreover, courts recognize a duty to avoid affirmative acts
that worsen the victim's situation. 2 Affirmative conduct by a bystander
that interferes with the acts of a rescuer results in liability for harm
resulting from that conduct. 63 Intentionally preventing assistance or
destroying the usefulness of an instrument necessary to give aid also
will result in liability.65 A bystander under no legal obligation who
voluntarily undertakes 66 a rescue must attempt to complete the rescue
and use reasonable care in doing so. 67 Through the undertaking of
a voluntary rescue, a duty arises.68 If the bystander represents to the
victim that he will extend aid, the bystander is liable for the harm
caused by failure to render the aid if, but for the bystander's conduct, aid would have been offered by others.6 9 Reliance by the victim
upon the promise to aid is necessary for the imposition of a duty."0
When confronted with each of these special circumstances, courts will
impose an affirmative duty to rescue.
Despite the attenuation of the common-law no duty rule when a
special relationship or circumstance exists, courts have not extended
the duty concept in other situations. The no duty rule continues to
apply in the absence of a legally recognized special relationship be61.

RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS

§322.

Farwell v. Keaton, 240 N.W,2d 217, 220 (Mich. 1976).
63. RESTATEKENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §327 (negligently preventing assistance).
64. Id. §326 (intentionally preventing assistance).
65. Id.
66. Whether an undertaking has occurred is a question for the trier of fact. Farwell v.
Keaton, 240 N.W.2d 217, 220 (1976).
67. See id. at 220; PROSSER, supra note 4, at 343-44. Persons injured during the course
of a rescue may recover from the individual whose negligence created the peril, but the rescue
must be absent rash or reckless conduct on the part of the rescuer. The theory underlying
this concept is the notion that rescuers as a class are always foreseeable when the defendant's
negligence places the plaintiff in peril. Solgaard v. Guy Transport, 6 Cal. 3d 361, 368, 491
P.2d 821, 825 (1971), 99 Cal. Rptr. 29, 33.
68. Farwell, 240 N.W.2d at 222.
69. See PROSSER, supra note 4, at 344; see also Thorne v. Dean, 4 Johns 84, 86 (N.Y. 1809).
70. Morgan v. County of Yuba, 230 Cal. App. 2d 938-45, 41 Cal. Rptr. 508, 513 (1964).
The duty to rescue may also be imposed contractually. See J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal.
2d 799, 803, 598 P.2d 60, 62, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407, 409 (1979); WXrIN, supra note 64, 566.
62.
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tween the victim and the bystander. 7' In most jurisdictions, mere friendship is insufficient to create a legally recognized special relationship."
Furthermore, the no duty rule still applies when the bystander did
not cause the harmful situation and when the victim intentionally or
recklessly places himself in danger." In summary, a common-law duty
to rescue is recognized only within narrowly construed judicial
limitations.
The judicial treatment of the duty to rescue in California has
followed the trends of the common law in other states,74 maintaining
the general rule that a bystander is under no duty to rescue.7 1 California
decisional law, however, has expanded the concept of duty more
liberally in other areas. 76 The evolution of the common-law concept
of duty in California will be analyzed next to determine whether
California courts should further expand the concept of duty to include the imposition of liability for failure to rescue.
COMMON-LAw DUTY N CAInFoRNIA

California courts, frequent forerunners in the expansion and revision of common-law rules,77 have expanded the concept of duty in
recent years." These courts have often abrogated common-law rules
that no longer are equitable or reflective of current societal attributes
or morals.79 For example, in Rowland v. Christian,8" the California
Supreme Court eliminated the common-law distinction between business
invitees, licensees, and trespassers."' Prior to Rowland, courts used

71. See PROSSER supra note 4, at 346.
72. See REsTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §314A. But see Farwell v. Keaton, 240 N.W.
2d 217, 222 (Mich. 1976) (holding that mere companions had a duty to aid each other in an
emergency).
73.

See Yania v. Bigan, 155 A.2d 343, 346 (Pa. 1959).

691 (1976).
75. See id.
76. See infra note 77-147 and accompanying text.
77. See People v. Drew, 22 Cal. 3d 333, 347, 583 P.2d 1318, 1325, 149 Cal. Rptr. 275,
282 (1978).

78.

See id. Whether an individual has a duty to act in a particular instance is a question

of law, which, in most cases, is decided by the judge. Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27
Cal. 3d 741, 750, 614 P.2d 728, 732, 167 Cal. Rptr. 70, 74 (1980). But see Richards v. Stanley,
43 Cal. 2d 60, 66, 271 P.2d 23, 27 (1954) (duty may be a preliminary question for the jury).
Duty is the initial question to be decided. After duty is determined, causation and proximate
cause still must be proven. Myers, 144 Cal. App. 3d at 894-95, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 737.

79. See, e.g., Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 239, 643 P.2d 954, 966, 182 Cal. Rptr.
337, 349 (1982) (recognizing a cause of action for wrongful life).
80.
81.
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these distinctions to classify the plaintiff and determine the type of
duty owed by the possessor of land. 82 The Rowland court recognized

that these classifications were inherited from antiquated English common law when laws and culture were deeply rooted in the land.83
In replacing the outmoded rules, the court set forth a number of considerations to be used in determining whether a duty exists.84 The

court concluded that the liability of a landowner must be determined
on the basis of whether a property owner has acted reasonably in
view of the foreseeability of injury to others.85 The Rowland decision
signifies the California common-law interest in balancing the
reasonableness of the defendant's behavior against the foreseeability

of harm to the victim in determining whether a duty is owed.
In Dillon v. Legg,8 6 decided the same year as Rowland, the Califor-

nia Supreme Court further expanded the concept of duty. In Dillon,
a parent witnessed the death of her child resulting from the negligence
of the defendant. The court recognized for the first time a cause of

action for negligent infliction of emotional distress brought by a plaintiff out of the zone of danger.87 Dillon emphasized the importance

of focusing on the foreseeability of harm when determining whether
a duty exists. 8 Specifically, the court stressed the high degree of

foreseeability that a parent of a small child would be in the vicinity
of an accident causing death or injury to the child, and suffer emotional harm as a result.8 9 From this foreseeability, the court imposed
a duty upon the defendant to exercise due care.90
In reaching this conclusion, the Dillon court engaged in a lengthy
82. Id. at 113, 443 P.2d at 565, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
83. Id.
84. These factors include:
[Tihe foreseeability of the harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff
suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and
the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy
of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and the consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability
for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.
Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d at 113, 443 P.2d at 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
85. 69 Cal. 2d at 119, 443 P.2d 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
86. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
87. Id. at 747, 441 P.2d at 925, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 88.
88. Id. at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80. The court set forth the following
guidelines for use in determining duty: (1) whether the plaintiff was located near the scene
of the accident as contrasted with one who was a distance away, (2) whether the shock resulted
from a direct emotional impact upon plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident, as contrasted with learning of the accident from others, and (3) whether
the plaintiff and the victim were closely related, as contrasted with an absence of any relationship or the presence of only a distant relationship. Id.
89. Id. at 741, 441 P.2d at 721, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
90. Id. at 747, 441 P.2d at 925, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 88.
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discussion of the concept of duty in tort law.9 ' The court acknowledged
that the concept of duty originated as a judicial device designed to
limit liability and diminish potentially large jury awards. 92 The court,
however, weighed this consideration against the basic premise of tort
litigation: "that there be a remedy for every substantial wrong." '93
To reconcile these competing interests, the court established the frequently cited theory that "duty is not sacrosanct in itself, but only
an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which
lead the law to say that a particular plaintiff is entitled to protection." 94
The policy considerations set forth in Dillon have similar application in a duty to rescue context. Following Dillon, the difficulty in
defining the limits of recovery for nonfeasance should not suffice to
deny recovery for all plaintiffs who are injured as a result of a
nonrescue. The expansion of duty would allow greater legal protection for innocent plaintiffs by imposing legal liability upon bystanders
who do not act to assist a victim in peril. As the public interest in
freedom from violent assault increases in our urbanized society,95 courts
should attach additional weight to that consideration in the analysis
of whether a duty to rescue exists.
Dillon and Rowland are both landmark cases in the expansion of
96
the concept of duty, and represent a trend in the law of California.
The pro-plaintiff direction of these and other recent cases indicates
an increased awareness of societal attitudes favoring greater protection for the consumer, the individual, and the innocent victim. 97
Although California courts currently are in accord with the general
common-law no duty rule, 98 the number of legally recognized special
relationships has been expanded beyond that of most jurisdictions. 99
A specific area of liberal judicial expansion of the concept of duty
in California is the duty to warn. California courts now readily extend
affirmative duties when a defendant stands in some special relation-

91.
92.

See id. at 734-38, 441 P.2d at 916-20, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 76-80.
Id. at 734, 441 P.2d at 916, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 76.

93.

Id.

94. Id.
95. See Soldano, 141 Cal. App. 3d at 449, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 314.
96. Comment, Thg Death of Palsgraf: A Comment on the Current Status of the Duty
Concept in California, 16 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 793, 798-99 (1979).
97. Id. at 799. In accord with this trend, the growth of the common law in California
can be illustrated by a variety of cases, including Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d
954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982) (creating a cause of action for wrongful life); Li v. Yellow
Cab, 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975) (adoption of comparative
negligence in California).
98. See Winkelman v. City of Sunnyvale, 59 Cal. 3d 509, 512, 130 Cal. Rptr. 690, 693 (1976).
99. See Soldano v. O'Daniels, 141 Cal. App. 3d 443, 448, 190 Cal. Rptr. 310, 313 (1983).
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ship either to (1) the person whose conduct needs to be controlled,
or (2) the foreseeable victim of the conduct.' ° The special relationship between the defendant and the victim may be much more at-

tenuated in a duty to warn context, as compared to the relationships
traditionally required by the courts. As a result, California courts rely heavily on the defendant's knowledge of impending harm to the
victim.' Since prior knowledge' 2 of impending harm relates directly
to the foreseeability of that harm, courts have determined that this
knowledge satisfies the foreseeability requirement set forth in Dillon."3
The duty to warn cases, like bystander cases, differ significantly from
the traditional exceptions to the no duty rule because the defendant
may or may not have prior contact with the victim. Regardless of
a prior relationship in a failure to warn context, the defendant's
knowledge of foreseeable harm results in the imposition of a legal
duty. Similar considerations apply in bystander cases since a prior
relationship between the bystander and the victim may be unlikely.
One line of cases imposes liability for a failure to warn of the known
violent tendencies of a child. In Ellis v. D'Angelo, l°4 for example,
the court found that the parents of a violent child had a duty to
warn a babysitter of these tendencies.' 05 Another case, Johnson v.
State of California,'°6 upheld a cause of action for failure to warn
foster parents of the dangerous tendencies of their foster child.' 7 In
both cases, the commonly recognized special relationship between plaintiff and defendant was absent. Instead, the court considered both the
relationship between the defendant and the violent child and the defendant's knowledge of the violent tendencies of the child to impose an
affirmative duty to warn.' 5
Another line of cases imposing liability for failure to warn involves
instances when a professional' 09 releases from protective custody an
individual who poses a predictable threat of harm to a specified or

100. See, e.g., Johnson v. State of California, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 797, 447 P.2d 352, 363,
73 Cal. Rptr. 240, 251 (1968).
101. See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 437-39,
551 P.2d 334, 345-47, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 25-27 (1976).

102. See id. (when defendant knows or should have known).
103. See id.
104. 116 Cal. App. 2d 310, 253 P.2d 675 (1953).
105. Id.
106. 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968).
107. Id.
108. See Ellis, 116 Cal. App. 2d at 317, 253 P.2d at 679; Johnson, 69 Cal. 2d at 797,
447 P.2d at 363, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 251.
109. See Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 439, 551 P.2d at 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
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easily identifiable individual."' Based on the special relationship between the defendant professional and the violent individual, and defendant's knowledge of foreseeable harm to the plaintiff, a duty to warn
is imposed."I' In Morgan v. County of Yuba," 2 a California appellate
court sustained a cause of action against a law enforcement official
who had promised to warn decedent before releasing a dangerous
criminal but failed to do so." 3 In 1976, the California Supreme Court
furthered the expansion of this duty in Tarasoff v. Regents of the
University of California."' In Tarasoff, the court held that a
psychotherapist had a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect
foreseeable victims when a patient indicates an intent to commit a
violent act." 5 Although recognizing the importance of the
psychotherapist-patient privilege," 6 the court held that the public interest in safety from violent assault is a greater social concern.' ' 7 These
policy considerations, combined with foreseeability of danger to the
victim, led the court to impose an affirmative duty to warn."' All
of the above mentioned cases extend the exceptions to the no duty
rule to plaintiffs having no special relationship with the defendant.
The foregoing duty to warn cases also illustrate how policy considerations are utilized by courts to impose affirmative duties in cases that
would be dismissed under the traditional no duty rule. The foreseebility of harm to the victim is an important element in these decisions. This foreseeability flows from the defendant's knowledge of
a third person's intent to harm the plaintiff. Furthermore, the societal
interest in safety from violent assault is emphasized as an important
policy consideration."' 9
These factors are helpful in analyzing a nonrescue case. A bystander
who witnesses a violent assault upon a victim has knowledge of the

110. Morgan v. County of Yuba, 230 Cal. App. 2d 938, 945, 41 Cal. Rptr. 508, 513 (1964);
Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 439, 551 P.2d at 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
111. See Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 439, 551 P.2d at 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
112. 230 Cal. App. 2d 938, 41 Cal. Rptr. 508.
113. Id. at 946, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 513.
114. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
115. Id. at 439, 551 P.2d at 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25.

116. Id. at 440, 551 P.2d at 346, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 26.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 442, 551 P.2d at 347, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 27; see also Myers v. Quesenberry,
144 Cal. App. 3d 888, 193 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1983). Myers sustained plaintiff's cause of action

against defendant physicians who failed to warn their patient against driving an automobile
in an uncontrolled diabetic state that was compounded by pregnancy complications. The court
held that liability is not conditioned on potential victims being readily identifiable as well as
foreseeable. Id. at 893, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 736.

119.
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foreseeability of further harm to the victim as a result of the
bystander's nonfeasance. The public interest in safety from violent
assault also should be emphasized by the courts in determining whether
a duty should be imposed in a nonrescue case, since emergency situations often result from criminal activity.
The expansion of duty in a nonrescue context is illustrated in a
recent California appellate case. In Soldano v. O'Daniels,2 ° the court
imposed an affirmative duty to assist in notifying authorities despite
the absence of any special relationship between the defendant and
the victim.' In Soldano, a patron from an establishment across the
street entered defendant's tavern and requested defendant's bartender
to notify the police for the benefit of a man who had been threatened.
The bartender refused to make the call and would not allow the patron
to use the telephone. No assistance was summoned, and the victim
was killed. The court held that the bartender owed a duty to the plaintiff's decedent to permit the use of the telephone for the placement
of an emergency call.' 22
The Soldano court characterized the conduct of the bartender as
a display of disregard for human life that is "morally wrong."' 23 Since
the general rule imposed no duty in this situation, the court stated
that the rule required "limited re-examination in light of current
societal conditions."' 24 The court recognized the dubious morality of
a law that falls to acknowledge the moral obligation of one person
to aid another in peril. 2 The Soldano court cited the various expansions in the common-law concept of duty. 26 Due to the absence of
a legally recognized special relationship, application of the general
rule would result in tort immunity.' 27 Emphasizing the callous behavior
of the bartender in this case, the court stated that the existing commonlaw rule of nonliability for nonfeasance must be scrutinized. 2 '
The Soldano court first examined the increase in crime in modern3
society' 219 and the legislative and societal responses. to this problem." 0
The necessity of citizen involvement in the prevention of crime also
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

141 Cal. App. 3d 443, 190 Cal. Rptr. 310 (1983).
Id. at 453, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 317.
Id.
Id. at 451, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 316.
Id. at 450, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 315.
See id. at 447, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 313.

126.
127.

See id. at 448, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 313.
See id.

128.

Id. at 449, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 314.

129. See id.
130. See id.
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was emphasized.' In addition, the court cited various legislative enactments involving the priority use of the telephone in emergency
situations. 132
In deciding whether to impose a duty, the court utilized factors
set forth in Rowland v. Christian.'33 The Soldano court concluded
that harm to the victim was foreseeable and that the bartender's refusal
to allow the use of the telephone was closely connected with the
resulting injury.' 34 Furthermore, the bartender's behavior was callously
indifferent to the possibility that the victim might suffer harm.'" The
court emphasized that no excessive costs were involved if aid had been
given. Moreover, a private citizen was not being legally forced to be
exposed to unnecessary dangers.' 3 6 Instead, the court expressly stated
that this ruling would not require a private citizen to open a private
home so that a stranger could use the telephone.' 3 The major policy
concern of Soldano was the "administrative factor,"'' 38 or the conse3
quences to the community if an affirmative duty were imposed.'
Recognizing that the reluctance of the judiciary to impose liability
for nonfeasance stems from the possible difficulties in setting standards and creating workable rules,' 4 0 the Soldano court stated that
the possibility of liability in this case did not constitute a great change
in the law.' 4'
42
Noting that the California Supreme Court holding in Tarasoffl
was based primarily upon the defendant's knowledge of foreseeable
danger to the victim, '3 the Soldano court relied on the bartender's
knowledge of peril to the victim in ruling that an affirmative duty
existed.' 44 Although a traditionally recognized special relationship was
absent in Soldano, the bartender did have knowledge of danger to
131.

See id. (citing the

NATIONAL ADVISORY COMlISSlON ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS

(1973)).
132. Soldano, 141 Cal. App. 3fd at 450, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 315; see, e.g., CAL. GOv'T CODE
§§53100, 53112 (relating to use of telephone in emergency situations).
133. See supra note 84.
134. Soldano, 141 Cal. App. 3d at 451, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 315.
135. Id. at 451, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 316.
136. Id. at 452, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 316.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 451-52, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 316. The term "administrative factor" was coined
by Professor Green in his analysis of determining whether a duty exists in a given case. Green,
The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1014, 1035-45 (1929).
139. See Soldano, 141 Cal. App. 3d at 451, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 316.
140. See id. at 452, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 316.
141. Id. at 454, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 318.
142. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14.
143. Id. at 437-39, 551 P.2d at 345-47, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25-27.
144. 141 Cal. App. 3d at 448, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 314. Duty would arise only if it were
clearly conveyed that imminent danger of physical harm existed. Id. at 452, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 316.
AND GOALS,
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the victim. From this knowledge an affirmative duty to aid arose.
The court viewed this imposition of an affirmative duty as only a
slight departure from the morally questionable no duty rule.145 Despite
the hesitance of the judiciary to impose affirmative duties, the Soldano
court opted to expand the law judicially rather than await legislative
action. 46 This decision represents the logical and necessary growth
of the common law.'4 7
These California cases have important implications for a discussion of potential tort liability for failure to rescue. Although the concept of duty has been liberally expanded, courts have been unwilling
to extend liability in most nonrescue cases.' The duty to warn cases,
however, can be analogized to nonrescue cases. In most situations,
both cases involve policy considerations relating to criminal violations
against the victim. In addition, the knowledge of foreseeable injury
is an important element of the duty to warn analysis. This factor
also should be used by courts in nonrescue cases. In weighing these
policy considerations, courts should find a duty to rescue when the
bystander consciously or willfully refuses to lend assistance.
As previously discussed,"' the judicial hesitation to impose affirmative duties results from the common-law difficulty in drawing a
workable framework for imposing liability. Since the resulting
nonliability for nonfeasance is morally offensive in many situations,
the California Legislature has enacted various statutes that impose
affirmative duties. 150 The legislative response to the common-law
disinclination to extend the concept of duty is demonstrated by these
enactments. By imposing legal duties, these laws encourage and mandate affirmative conduct by private citizens.
AFFIRMATIVE DuTIEs IMPOSED BY LEGISLATION IN CALIFORNIA

Due to the relatively slow growth of judicial exceptions to the no
duty rule, the California Legislature often has responded by imposing statutory duties. Consistent with the societal concern regarding

the increase in crime in the United States,"' the California Legislature
enacted Government Code section 13970 in 1965, expressly declaring
145.
146.

See id. at 454, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 318.
See id. at 453, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 317.

147.

See id. The court viewed this expansion of duty as particularly logical in relation to
§327 (intentional interference with the acts of a rescuer). Id.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

148.
149.

150.
151.

See Winkelman, 59 Cal. 3d at 512, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 693.
See supra notes 32-56 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE §13970.
See Soldano, 141 Cal. App. 3d at 449, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 314.
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that direct action on the part of private citizens to prevent the commission of crimes benefits the entire public.' 5 2 Meritorious actions on
the part of private citizens to apprehend criminals or rescue persons
in immediate danger' 3 may be indemnified by the state pursuant to
specified guidelines. s'" Although this provision does not require affirmative action by members of the general public, the law clearly is
intended to encourage public participation in crime control.'
The Legislature has created mandatory affirmative duties in specified
situations. For example, the California Vehicle Code imposes an af-6
5
firmative duty upon an automobile driver involved in an accident'
to stop and render assistance to any persons injured in the accident.'",
The duty imposed by this statute is independent of the fault of the
driver or the contributory negligence of the injured person.' 58 The
California Harbors and Navigation Code imposes a similar duty upon
the operator of a vessel.' 9 This statute requires the rendering of
assistance to other persons involved in a vessel collision, accident,
or other casualty.' 6 Furthermore, this statute creates civil immunity
from a suit for damages if the rescuer acted as a responsible, prudent person would have acted under the same or similar
circumstances.' 6' The California Penal Code imposes misdemeanor
liability for willfully permitting child abuse.' 62 Arguably, the statutory
language is broad enough to encompass individuals who have
knowledge of ongoing child abuse.' 63 This statute, therefore, may create
an affirmative duty to report instances of child abuse to the specified
authorities. ' 6' Additionally, the California Civil Code imposes an
6
affirmative duty upon the owner of a dog that has bitten someone.' 1
152.
153.

CAL. GOV'T CODE §13970.
Immediate danger includes fire, death, or other catastrophe. Id.

154. See id.
155.

See Soldano, 141 Cal. App. 3d at 449, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 314. The legislative awareness

of the crime problem was evidenced more recently by several well publicized increases in the
severity of punishment for criminal offenses. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§667 (enhancing
sentences for habitual criminals), 667.5 (additional sentences for prior violent felonies), 12022
(additional penalties for firearm use during a felony).
156.
157.

CAL. VEH. CODE §§20001-20003.
Id.

158. Id. Other states impose a similar duty. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. Ch 95 1/2 §11-403
(1973).
159.
160.
161.
162.

CAL. HARE. & NAY. CODE §656.
Id. §656(a).
See id. §656(b).
CAL. PENAL CODE §273a.

163.

See Comment, Reporting Child Abuse: When Moral Obligations Fail, 15 PAC. L. J.

189, 212 (1983).

164. See id. at 213.
165. CAL. CIv. CODE §3342.5.
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Under this statute, the dog owner is required to take reasonably

necessary steps to remove any danger presented to other persons from
dog bites.' 6 6

Each of these laws is the result of legislative balancing of the interests of individual citizens with the interests of society as a whole.

These laws indicate the desire of the California Legislature to encourage
conduct in conformity with current societal needs. Similar concerns
were addressed by the Vermont Legislature in 1967 when the Duty
to Aid the Endangered Act was promulgated. The following section
discusses the Vermont law and the more recent legislative alternatives
to the common-law no duty rule.
LEGISLATIVELY IMPOSED DUTY TO RESCUE

Until recently, the common-law no duty'rule was followed in fortynine states. Although each jurisdiction has created judicial or legislative
exceptions, the rule in the main has persisted.1 67 Prior to 1982, only

one state had recognized the importance of a statutory duty and
enacted legislation requiring rescue. 6" In the wake of the infamous
Genovese murder, 69 the Vermont Legislature in 1967 promulgated the
Duty to Aid the Endangered Act.' 70 While the common-law rules
166. Id.; see WiTrKI, supra note 57, §562(3). In addition to these affirmative duties, the
California Legislature also has recognized the importance of the telephone in procuring emergency
assistance. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §53100 (establishing a statewide emergency number and
eliminating the coin requirement); CAL. PENAL CODE §384 (creating criminal liability for refusal
to relinquish a party line when informed of a need to notify authorities of an emergency).
167. See generally, PROSSER, supra note 4, at 341-43 (discussion of judicial exceptions to
the no duty rule).
168. VT. ANN. STAT. TIT. 12 §519 (1967).
169. Kitty Genovese was stabbed to death on a residential street in Queens, New York City
during an attack that lasted over 35 minutes. Thirty-eight witnesses saw or heard the attack
from a nearby apartment building, but no one made an effort to assist the victim or notify
the authorities. The first call to the police was almost an hour after the attack began. The
loss of humanity by society was symbolized by this famous incident. See Kiesel, supra note
1, at 1208.
170. VT. ANN. STAT. TrT. 12 §519 (1967). The statute reads as follows: §519 Emergency
Medical Care
(a) A person who knows that another is exposed to grave physical harm shall to
the extent the same can be rendered without danger or peril to himself or without
interference with important duties owed to others, give reasonable assistance to the
exposed person unless that assistance or care is being provided by others.
(b) A person who provides reasonable assistance in compliance with subsection (a)
of this section shall not be liable in civil damages unless his acts constitute gross
negligence or unless he will receive or expects to receive remuneration. Nothing contained in this subsection shall alter existing law with respect to tort liability of a
practitioner of the healing arts for acts committed in the ordinary course of his practice.
(c) A person who willfully violates subsection (a) of this section shall be fined not
more than $100.00.
Id.

1277

Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 15

establish a duty to rescue in the presence of special relationships and
circumstances, the Vermont statute substantially expands the affirmative duty beyond this to anyone who knows another is exposed
to grave danger.17' The statute specifically requires reasonable assistance
that can be rendered without danger or peril to the rescuer or others
to whom the rescuer owes a duty. 72 The statute imposes misdemeanor
liability in the form of a fine. 73 In addition, the Vermont statute
provides immunity from civil damages unless the rescuer's acts con174
stitute gross negligence or the rescuer expects to receive remuneration.
Although the enactment of the Vermont statute was extremely innovative relative to the common law, the effect of requiring a duty
is debatable. No formal documentations of prosecutions under the
Vermont statute have been made. '7 Furthermore, only one published
opinion has cited the Vermont rescue statute, and this decision, State
v. Joyce,17 1 merely provided a limited interpretation of the statutory
language.
In Joyce, the Vermont Supreme Court addressed the argument that
five witnesses to a physical altercation were required to assist under
the Vermont rescue statute. 77 The court held that the affirmative duty set forth in the rescue statute did not require a rescuer to intervene
in a fight.' 78 The court apparently relied on the portion of the statute
that requires assistance only if the rescue does not subject the rescuer
to injury.' 79 As a result, a duty was not found because of the
foreseeability that a rescuer intervening in a fight could suffer injury. 1s0
The Vermont statute does not expressly require bystanders to report
crimes to authorities,' 8 ' and Joyce did not address the potential criminal
liability of the witnesses for failure to notify authorities.8 2 Presumably,
a witness observing a crime in progress that is exposing the victim
to grave physical harm is under a duty to notify the proper
171.

Id. See generally Comment, supra note 36; Franklin, Vermont Requires Rescue: A

Comment, 25 STAN. L. Ray. 51 (1972) (discussing the implications of the Vermont rescue statute).
tions of the Vermont rescue statute).

172.

VT. STAT. ANN.

W.

12 §519(a).

173. Id. The penalty for violation of the Vermont statute is a misdemeanor punishable by
a fine of not more than $100. Id. §519(c).
174. Id. §519(b).
175. See Comment, supra note 36, at 160 n.117.
176. 433 A.2d 271 (Vt. 1981).
177. Id. at 273.
178. Id.
179. See VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 12 §519.

180.

See id.

181.
182.

See id.; Comment, supra note 36, at 169 n.160.
Comment, supra note 36, at 169 n.160.
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authorities.' 8 3 Due to the limited judicial interpretation of the Vermont law, however, and the absence of statistics concerning enforceability, uncertainty exists regarding whether the law effectively
promotes this duty.' 4
Despite uncertainty concerning whether the Vermont statute is enforceable as a practical matter, four states since 1982 have elected
to impose a statutory affirmative duty to rescue. Responding to recent events such as the multiple rape in New Bedford,' 5 these laws
demonstrate the public desire to improve crime control by mandating
citizen involvement in the reporting of criminal activity."8 " These
legislative enactments reflect the realization that certain behavior regarding victims in danger is so offensive to community morality that
imposition of criminal liability is required.' 8 7
RECENT LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS IMPOSING AN
AFFIRMATIVE DUTY TO RESCUE

Statutes imposing an affirmative duty to rescue have been enacted
in Minnesota, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island. A similar statute is
pending in the Pennsylvania Legislature. Substantively similar to the
Vermont statute, the duty to rescue law recently enacted in Minnesota
requires bystanders to render reasonable assistance to any person
exposed to grave physical harm.' 88 The bystander is not required to
risk danger to himself."8 9 Reasonable assistance may take the form
of prompt notification to the proper authorities.' 9 Moreover, the
bystander is granted civil immunity from suit for good faith efforts
to rescue.' 9 ' The Minnesota provision, mandating rescue whenever a
183. See id.
184. Id. at 144.
185. According to Representative Barbara Gray of Massachusetts (author of Mass. H5961),
the new Massachusetts law is a direct response to the New Bedford incident. Telephone conversation with Barbara Gray, Massachusetts State Representative (October 19, 1983) (notes on
file at the Pacific Law Journal).
186. See Kiesel, supra note 1, at 1208.
187. See Feldbrugge, supra note 13, at 654.
188. MnN. STAT. §604.05 (1982). The statute provides in pertinent part:

(1) Duty to Assist. Any person at the scene of an emergency who knows that another
person is exposed to or has suffered grave physical harm shall, to the extent that
he can do so without danger and peril to himself or others, give reasonable assistance
to the exposed person. Reasonable assistance may include obtaining or attempting
to obtain aid from law enforcement or medical personnel. Any person who violates
this section is guilty of a petty misdemeanor. ...

Id.
189.

Id.

190.
191.

Id.
See id.
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bystander has knowledge of grave danger or peril to the victim, is
not limited to instances of danger resulting from criminal activity.' 92
In contrast with the Vermont and Minnesota statutes, the recently
enacted Massachusetts,' 93 Rhode Island,""' and proposed Pennsylvania'95 provisions hinge upon knowledge of criminal activity. For
example, Massachusetts mandates a report to authorities when a bystander witnesses or has knowledge of an aggravated rape, rape, murder,
manslaughter, or armed robbery. 9 6 The Pennsylvania law would also
require the reporting of kidnapping and arson.' 97 Rhode Island limits
the affirmative duty to the reporting of any first degree sexual
assault.' 9 Unlike the other legislative enactments, however, the Rhode
Island law requires the victim to sign the complaint before the state
may seek a conviction under the law.' 99
These legislative enactments depart from the traditional judicial treatment of liability for failure to rescue. Instead of the general commonlaw rule that results in tort immunity for nonfeasance, these laws create
affirmative duties that require citizen involvement in emergency
assistance and crime control, prevention, and enforcement. The laws
reflect a legislative decision to incorporate moral standards with accompanying criminal sanctions into the laws of the jurisdiction. As
a result, altruistic behavior is encouraged, and antisocial conduct is

192.
193.

Compare id. with R.I. GEN. LAWS §11-37-3.1.
MAss. GEN. LAws. ANN. ch. 268, §40 (December 1983). The statute provides:

Whoever knows that another person is a victim of aggravated rape, rape, murder,
manslaughter or armed robbery and is at the scene of said crime shall, to the extent
that said person can do so without danger or peril to himself or others, report said

crime to an appropriate law enforcement official as soon as reasonably practicable.
Any person who violates this section shall be punished by a fine of not less than

five hundred nor more than two thousand and five hundred dollars.
Id.
194.

R.I. GEM. LAW §11-37-3.1. The statute provides:

Duty to Report: Any person, other than the victim, who know or has reason to
know that a first degree sexual assault or attempted first degree sexual assault is
taking place in his/her presence shall immediately notify the state police or the police
department of the city or town in which said assault or attempted assault is taking
place of said crime.
Id.
195. This legislation is currently pending in the Pennsylvania Legislature. The proposed statute
reads: 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. §5105 (1983):

(a) A person commits an offense if.

.

. he fails to report to police, within 24 hours

of its commission, a murder, rape, kidnapping, robbery or arson which he has observed

being committed and which he knows during its commission, or learns within 24
hours if its commission, is a crime.
Id.
196.
197.
198.

See MAss. GEN. LAws. ANN. ch. 268, §40.
See proposed PA. CoNs. STAT. §5105 (1983).
See R.I. GEN. LAWS §11-37-3.1.

199.

See id. §11-37-3.2.

1280

1984 / Duty to Rescue

penalized. A statutory duty to rescue should be enacted in California
because of the similar prevalence of these moral considerations and
the public interest in crime control. 00 The policy considerations relating
to the enactment of a legislatively imposed duty to rescue are important in determining whether laws of this nature are an effective method
of fostering rescue behavior. The following sections investigate these
considerations.
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

Although most individuals would agree that a bystander who
witnesses a victim in peril has a moral duty to rescue the victim or
provide some reasonable assistance,2 0 ' differences of opinion exist
regarding whether a duty should be legally imposed. Proponents of
a statutory duty to rescue cite European laws as continuing
evidence
02
that a legislated duty can be imposed and enforced.
Most European countries impose varying forms of a duty to
rescue. 20 3 Although these statutes differ in some respects, all require
that reasonable assistance be undertaken when a bystander witnesses
the peril of another person.20 4 These European countries usually incorporate the duty to rescue provisions within the criminal code, 0 5 providing penalties consisting of both prison sentences and fines. 06 Thus,
European criminal law punishes persons who, without risking danger,
were able to assist another person in serious peril and failed to act
affirmatively. 0 7
Growing concern over prevention of crime '0 has led commentators
to argue that American society as a whole needs to become more
involved and responsible for the reporting and prevention of crime.20 9
The traditional common-law rule continues to condone behavior that

200. See Soldano, 141 Cal. App. 3d at 449, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 314.
201. See Yania v. Bigan, 155 A.2d 343, 346 (Pa. 1959).
202. See Ogren, supra note 1, at 218; Dawson, Rewardsfor the Rescue of Human Life?,
in TBE GOOD Si trr
AND TnE LAW, 73 (J. Ratcliffe ed. 1966); SHEL=F, supra note 8, at 108.
203. See Franklin, supra note 171, at 59.

204.
205.
France,
206.

See id.
European countries that impose a statutory duty to rescue include Turkey, Italy, Poland,
Denmark, and Czechoslovakia. Feldbrugge, supra note 13, appendix.
See SHmEFF, supra note 8, at 109; Rudzinski, The Duty To Rescue: A Comparative
Analysis, in THE GOOD SAmARrrAN AND BEa LAW, 108-10 (J. Ratcliffe ed. 1966).
207. Feldbrugge, supra note 13, at 652.
208. See Soldano, 141 Cal. App. 3d at 449, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 314. "Crime
is a blight on our society and a matter of great citizen concern." Id
209. See Kiesel, supra note 1, at 1209; Soldano, 141 Cal. App. 3d, at 449, 190 Cal. Rptr.
at 314 (citing CUmE PREVENTION REPORT, supra note 131, to support the proposition that citizen
involvement is crucial to law enforcement).
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is unacceptable in a civilized society.2"' Placing legal sanctions upon
morally reprehensible conduct strengthens the existing moral duty to
aid others in emergency situations. 2 ' These laws reinforce the sense
of community and caring that society desires.2" 2

The principle objection to the enactment of a statutory duty requiring rescue in the United States appears to be the notion that a
legal system should not mandate altruism and legislate morality. 2'"
The rescue statutes in Europe, however, seemingly are based on moral
precepts that, in turn, are promoted by the imposition of legal
liability. 1 ' These criminal sanctions reflect the current moral values
of European society.2"' Our criminal provisions also should reflect
these concerns because similar moral considerations concerning the

duty to rescue prevail in the United States.2" 6
Opponents of a legal duty to rescue question the effectiveness and
enforceability of a rescue statute. 21 7 The absence of enforcement difficulties in Europe refutes these contentions.2 8 Some commentators
argue that laws alone cannot make people better and that human
morality cannot be legislated.219 Research on human behavior, however,
indicates that people ordinarily act in accordance with the current
law.220 Furthermore, these studies indicate that awareness of a particular legal obligation is likely to influence the decision of a potential rescuer. 22' The bystander may be motivated to act by the knowledge
of potential legal liability for inaction.2 22 Since the behavior is legally
mandated, the desirability of rescue activity may be enhanced. 2 3

210. See Wehrwein, Samaritan Law Poses Difficulties, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 22, 1983, at 5,
col. 1.
211. Ogren, supra note 1, at 218.
212. Id. Difficulties arise, however, in deciding whether equity should coerce a bystander
into being a "Good Samaritan" through legal sanctions. D'Amato, supra note 56, at 801.
Furthermore, difficulties arise in standardizing omissions and creating liability for inaction.
Franklin, supra note 171, 56 n.37.
213. See id.; see also Comment, supra note 36, at 148 n.30.
214. See Feldbrugge, supra note 13, at 653.
215. See id. at 654.
216. Reports have been made that a majority of Americans favor a statutorily imposed
duty to rescue. See Briefs, TIAL MAGAZE, Nov. 1983, Vol. 19, No. 11, at 16.
217. See Wehrwein, supra note 210, at 5; Note, The Duty to Rescue in Tort Law: Implications of Research on Altruism, 55 IND. L.J. 551, 556 (1980).
218. See Rudzinski, supra note 206, at 121.
219. Note, supra note 9, at 324.
220. See generally Note, supra note 217, at 556 (discussions of the passive bystander
phenomenon).
221. See id. at 557-58; Franklin, supra note 169, at 60.
222. See Note, supra note 217, at 560; D'Amato, supra note 56 at 805.
223. Franklin, supra note 171, at 58. In situations where no legal duty to rescue exists,
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Extensive public discussions preceding the adoption of a rescue law
would aid public awareness of the law and improve compliance. 224
Statutes that impose relatively minor penalties 225 may be seen as
merely symbolic commentary on human morality.2 26 A civil liability
supplement to the criminal provisions, however, may improve the
stature of these laws. Civil liability would be an appropriate addition
to the legislative proscription of nonrescue behavior.22 7 Private litigants
who successfully prove the essential causal relationship between harm
to the victim and the defendant's nonfeasance would be able to seek
damages based upon the breach of a duty to rescue. 22 Furthermore,
rescue statutes that grant civil immunity for good faith rescue efforts
reward altruistic behavior.
Various arguments have been presented concerning the reasons why
a duty to rescue should not be imposed legislatively through the Penal
Code. These conjectural arguments apparently stem from a continued
emphasis on the freedom of individual citizens to choose whether to
act in an altruistic manner. These objections include (1) the effect
of a duty to rescue statute upon the availability and truthfulness of
witnesses in a criminal proceeding, (2) the difficulties in proving the
elements required in a duty to rescue statute, and (3) concerns regarding the privacy of the victim, particularly in sexual assault cases.
A.

Adverse Effect upon Criminal Witnesses

Duty to rescue statutes may have an adverse effect upon witnesses
in criminal proceedings.22 9 Witnesses who fear imposition of criminal
liability for nonrescue may refrain from offering information. 23 Law
enforcement investigations may be impeded by the hesitation of
witnesses. Thus, prosecuting jurisdictions should use discretion in the
application of a criminal duty to rescue provision. Witnesses already
called to testify at a criminal proceeding may hesitate to testify truthfully following a violation of the duty to rescue statute. 23 ' As in any

current statistics indicate that the larger the group of potential rescuers, the less likely each
individual is to act, and therefore the less likely that a rescue will occur. Id. at 60. Although
the degree of fault of each tortfeasor could be difficult to determine, this should not be a
bar to plaintiff's cause of action. Comment, supra note 36, at 180.
224. See Franklin, supra note 171, at 58.

225.

See

226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

See Kiesel, supra note 1, at 1209 (quoting Baltimore attorney Larry Ritchie).
Franklin, supra note 171, at 55-56.
Id. at 56.
See Kiesel, supra note 1, at 1208.
See Wehrwein, supra note 210, at 5.
See id.

VT. STAT. ANN. TIT.

12, §519. Vermont imposes a $100.00 fine. Id.
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other judicial proceeding, however, the veracity of the witness is tested
through cross examination under oath.
B. Problems in Proving Statutory Elements
Problems of proof may arise for the state in attempting to prove
that the bystander had knowledge of another person's danger and
recognized that danger as serious. "32 The prosecuting jurisdiction would
be required to prove this knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt. If
the proceeding were civil, the plaintiff would be required to prove
this knowledge by a preponderance of the evidence.233 In addition,
the plaintiff would be required to prove the other elements of a
negligence cause of action, namely causation and proximate cause.
The criminal statutes that are in effect do not specify whether the
state must prove that anything the bystander might have done would
have helped.13 1 Some commentators view this as a major flaw in the
new laws.235 This argument is faulty, however, because the duty arises
from the defendant's knowledge of the peril. The lack of a legal duty
is only the initial inquiry. A more difficult problem would be showing an irrefutable connection between the final harm and the acts
leading to the harm. Whether affirmative conduct on the part of the
bystander could, or would, save the victim from harm is not important to the determination of duty. These issues relate to whether the
bystander's conduct was the proximate cause of the injury.
C. Concern for the Privacy of the Victim
Questions also have been raised regarding the privacy of the victim, particularly in relation to the Rhode Island statute, which requires the victim to sign the complaint to prosecute the bystander. 36
Because of concern for the personal safety and privacy of sexual assault
victims, courts should use discretion in these cases, and close proceedings to protect the privacy rights of these victims. 237 These considerations are particularly important when the victim of the sexual
232.

Id.

233. See CAL. EvrD. CODE §115; see also B. WIrraTN,
1966) (explaining the burden of proof in civil cases).

CALIFORMA

EVIDENCE §208 (2d ed.

234. Wehrwein, supra note 210, at 5.
235. Id.
236. R.I. GEN. LAws §11-37-3.1; see Kiesel, supra note 1, at 1208. The Rhode Island statute
was opposed by the Rhode Island Rape Crisis Center and the Rhode Island Chapter of the
American Civil Liberties Union. Id.
237. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §868.1 (allowing closure of a preliminary hearing in sexual offense cases).
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assault is a minor. In addition to the policy considerations set forth
in this section, moral considerations surrounding a duty to rescue must
be discussed. The folloWing section presents these moral factors.
MORAL CONSIDERATIONS
As members of a civilized society, citizens should feel a personal
responsibility for the protection of each other, particularly in situations of danger or peril. 238 The purpose of duty to rescue laws is
to encourage and support positive behavior within society. 239 These
laws give effect to valuable moral principles.24 The statutes do not
require heroism; 241 they require only a reasonable amount of affirmative action. The statutes ordinarily provide the potential rescuer
with a choice to intervene personally or obtain
help and assistance.242
24 3
punished.
is
assist
to
Only callous refusal
The function of the law in society is two-fold. 24 The first function
is to coerce behavior that is thought to be in the best interests of
society. 245 The second function is a teaching role that serves to illustrate
the behavior desired from the individuals within a society. 246 Regrettably, the common-law view of rescue fails in the teaching function
of the law. 247 Rather than teaching members of society that rescues
are exemplary, the law encourages selfish nonrescue behavior.24 ' The
imposition of an affirmative duty to rescue would reconcile legal and
moral principles. The enactment of a criminal statute requiring affirmative conduct to assist makes a bystander's behavior a matter of
public concern, 2 9 and criminal sanctions against passivity protect a
legitimate social interest.2 "'
Following the adoption of a criminal statute imposing a duty to
rescue, courts should use the statute as the standard of care in a suit
brought by the victim for civil damages. As a supplement to the
legislative proscription of nonrescue behavior, civil damages would

238. See D'Amato, supra note 56, at 806.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

Ogren, supra note 1, at 218.
Kiesel, supra note 1, at 1208.
Ogren, supra note 1, at 218.
See, e.g., MwN. STAT. §604.05.
See Rudzinski, supra note 206, at 121.
See Ogren, supra note 1, at 218.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

249.
250.

See D'Anato, supra note 57, at 808.
See id. at 807.
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serve to put the victim in his original position. Furthermore, civil immunity for good faith efforts to comply with the duty to rescue statute
would reward altruistic behavior. The following section discusses supplemental civil liability.
SUPPLEMNTAL CIvL LBIITY

A criminal statute in California may be used as the basis for civil
liability. California Evidence Code section 669 codifies the presumption of negligence rule in cases when a violation of a criminal statute
has occurred.25 ' A criminal duty to rescue statute, therefore, could
be used by the victim to recover damages from a passive bystander
who refused to render assistance.
The imposition of civil liability would serve to compensate the victim who was not aided by a potential rescuer with knowledge of the
victim's peril.25 2 As a supplement to criminal provisions, civil liability would provide additional monetary sanctions against those who
do not act in the victim's best interests. 2 " Combined with a civil immunity for good faith efforts to rescue, altruistic behavior would be
encouraged and morally offensive behavior would be discouraged.
Although the passive bystander is not the initial cause of the victim's peril,25 ' legal culpability should arise from the conscious indifference of the bystander to the knowledge of peril to the victim. Allowing recovery of civil damages for nonrescue could lead to financial
rewards for risk takers who continually subject themselves to dangerous
situations.255 If the conduct of the victim creates the peril, however,
common-law rules imposing no duty would remain intact. Permitting
a civil cause of action may also lead to fraudulent claims, such as
staged accidents. 256 The California Supreme Court in Dillon v. Legg,
however, clearly held that fear of fraudulent claims is not a suffi25 7
cient basis to deny recovery.

251.

CAL. EvrD.

CODE

§669. To apply this provision, the violation must be of a statute

(1) intended to protect a class of persons of which plaintiff is a member, and (2) protect the
plaintiff from the type of harm suffered. Id.
252. Franklin, supra note 171, at 56.

253. See id. at 55.
254.

See Comment, supra note 36, at 179.

255.

See D'Amato, supra note 56, at 808.

256. See id. One commentator argues that tort liability may be applied unevenly because
of the ineffectiveness of money judgments against defendants who are judgment proof. See

id.*at 809. This theory has no more viability in a no-rescue case than it has in any other
traditional tort cause of action.
257.
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LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL

The moral and policy considerations discussed in the preceding section should serve as the basis for an amendment to the California
Penal Code to impose an affirmative duty to rescue. Legislation of
this type has a dual purpose. First, the law must be practically designed
so that rescues are actually effected. Second, the law should be structured to encourage bystanders to act affirmatively to assist victims
in peril, rather than consciously deciding to refrain from offering
assistance. As a result, altruistic behavior would be encouraged, and
the Legislature officially would sanction nonrescue when the bystander
intentionally refuses to render aid. The statute should require the prosecuting jurisdiction to prove that the bystander knew or should have
known that the victim was in serious danger. Rescuers should not
be required to risk any danger to themselves, and the statute should
allow the bystander to respond reasonably. Therefore, a specific type
of rescue behavior need not be set forth in the statute. Varying examples of emergency situations necessarily require statutory language
that is adaptable to differing fact patterns. As noted in the Soldano
opinion, a telephone call to the authorities will rarely subject the caller
to bodily harm.2"8 Thus, notification to proper authorities within a
reasonable amount of time should be specifically included in the law.
Good faith efforts to comply with the provisions of the statute should
result in tort immunity. Both fines and jail sentences should be
available, and the prosecutorial focus should be upon bystanders who
callously or consciously refuse to render aid.
A statutory provision incorporating these principles would serve to
illustrate the type of behavior that society should encourage. By enacting a duty to rescue statute, the California Legislature would mandate rescue behavior when the bystander has knowledge of the victim's peril. A duty to rescue provision would reconcile humanitarian
and legal obligations by requiring assistance when it presents no serious
risk to the bystander.
CONCLUSION

The concept of duty in California gradually has been expanded by
the California Supreme Court. Using public policy considerations and
moral obligations, courts have devised various exceptions to the general
common-law rule requiring no affirmative conduct to assist another

258.

141 Cal. App. at 451, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 315.
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person in danger. The courts now recognize a variety of special relationships that give rise to an affirmative duty to rescue. California
courts have diluted the close special relationships traditionally required
by the common law, resulting in an increase in the number of cases
in which an affirmative duty is imposed. In a recent California appellate court case, the mere knowledge of impending harm to a victim sufficed to impose an affirmative duty to rescue.
The California Legislature also has recognized that affirmative duties
should be imposed under specified circumstances. Furthermore, the
Legislature expressly has approved rescue activity by private citizens
and provides indemnification by the State of California for rescue
activity in certain cases. Recent events such as the multiple rape in
New Bedford, Massachusetts have led some states to enact duty to
rescue laws. These statutes are patterned after Vermont and Continental
European statutes. Although these laws vary, they all require affirmative conduct if a witness has knowledge of the peril to the victim.
Due to the expansion of the concept of duty in California and the
express legislative approval of rescue attempts, a statutory duty to
rescue should be enacted. The statute should impose criminal penalties.
Furthermore, California Evidence Code Section 669 should be used
to allow a civil cause of action by the victim against the passive
bystander. Civil immunity should be granted for good faith efforts
to comply with the provisions of the statute. The imposition of legal
liability for failure to rescue would reverse a long-standing commonlaw rule that has no place in modern urban society.
Recently, the press carried an account of the rescue of a woman
who had been swept downstream by a strong river current. She was
seen by three teenagers riding their bicycles along the river, and they
made efforts to assist her. One of the boys went to summon help,
and the other two rode along the river bank, trying to catch up with
the struggling victim. After about a mile down river, they came abreast,
waded into the water and pulled the victim out of the water. At that
moment, one of the boys discovered that he had helped save his
mother's life.259
"It serves to remind us that we can never know when we may be
bystanders and who our victim will be; or when we may be victims
and who our bystander will be." 2"
Beverly Anne Seagraves
259. See Boy Races River, Finds He's Saved His Own Mother L.A. Times, June 5, 1978,

at 1, col. 1.
260.
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Appendix
Proposed statute: California Penal Code
Duty to Rescue
(a) Any person at the scene of an emergency who knows that
another person is exposed to, or has suffered, grave physical harm,
shall give reasonable assistance to the extent that the assistance can
be rendered without danger or peril to the rescuer or others. Obtaining or attempting to obtain aid from law enforcement or medical personnel may be deemed reasonable assistance.
(b) Any person who renders assistance in good faith compliance
with subdivision (a) will be immune from civil liability, except in the
case of gross negligence.
(c) A violation of subdivision (a) is punishable by imprisonment
in the county jail not exceeding one year, or by fine not exceeding
one thousand ($1,000), or by both fine and imprisonment.
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